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Mar. 1957] 0 'MALLEY v. PETROLEUM MAINTENANCE Co. 107 
[48 C.2d 107; 308 P.2d 9] 
[L.A. No. 24302. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1957.] 
E. P. O'MALLEY, as Secretary, LOCAL 128, OIL WORK-
ERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, Respondent, v. 
PETROLEUM MAIN'rENANCE COMPANY (a Limited 
Partnership) et al., Appellants. 
[la, lb] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-
A company which entered into a collective bargaining con-
tract with a union is bound by a submission agreement signed 
by it and the union, submitting to arbitration the questions 
whether the company's discharge of a union member was 
arbitrable and whether such discharge was proper, despite 
the fact that the trial court, in ordering arbitration, merely 
ordered arbitration of the merits of the member's discharge. 
[2] Arbitration-Powers of Arbitrator.-The powers of an arbi-
trator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipu-
lation of submission. 
[3] Id.-Award-Finality.-A party may not agree to arbitrate 
a question and then, if the decision goes against him, litigate 
the question in another proceeding, even though the submis-
sion agreement may provide that the parties are not to be 
deemed "to have waived any rights given them by law." 
[4] Id.-Award-Conclusiveness.-Arbitrators do not exceed their 
powers merely because they assign an erroneous reason for 
their decision. 
[5] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-Any 
controversy under a collective bargaining contract which re-
quires first a determination that the contract does or does not 
define the rights or duties of the parties in an existing situation 
is subject to arbitration if the agreement provides for arbi-
tration of disputes that arise out of the contract. 
[6] Arbitration-Award-Court Review.-The merits of a contro-
versy between the parties to an arbitration are not subject 
to judicial review. 
[7] Labor-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-In a 
proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, the court did not 
err in refusing to receive in evidence two exhibits offered by 
one party which tended to show that, despite the submission 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 19 et seq.; Labor, 
§ 133; Am.Jur., Arbitration and Award, § 83 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5, 7] Labor, § 3a; [2] Arbitration, 
§ 18; [3] Arbitration, § 26; [ 4] Arbitration, § 30; [6] Arbitration, 
§ 37.1. 
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agreement, it did not intend tho arbitrability of the question 
to be decided by tho arbitrators, the award having been within 
the issues submitted. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court 
Angeles County confirming an arbitration award. 
Vasey, Judge. Affirmed. 
Madden & McCarry for Appellants. 
of Los 
Beach 
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand and Fred Okrand for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal by Petroleum Mainte-
nance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Company") 
from a judgment of the superior court confirming an arbitra-
tion award in favor of Oil vVorkers International Union, CIO, 
!Jocal128 (hereinafter referred to as "Union"). 
On July 16, 1947, the Company entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement with the Union. On October 5, 1951, 
Company discharged one Frank J. Semmett, a member of 
Local 128. On April 10, 1952, the Union filed a petition for 
an order directing arbitration of Semmett's discharge. On 
June 20, 1952, the trial court granted the petition and ordered 
the matter arbitrated. Company appealed from the order, 
but the District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal (Corbett 
v. Petrolettrn JJia:intenance Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 21 [258 P.2d 
1077]) on the ground that section 1293 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure was controlling and that section did not provide 
for an appeal from an order directing arbitration. 
The Union's petition to the superior court was for either 
arbitration of the grievance of Semmett, or arbitration of 
the question whether the Semmett discharge was subject to 
arbitration. The superior court ordered only arbitration of 
the merits of the discharge. 
Union and Company on January 22, 1954, entered into a 
submission agreement and pursuant thereto three arbitrators 
were selected. The submission agreement, signed by both 
Company and Union, provided that the parties agreed to 
s1.1bmit to arbitration (1) whether the discharge of Semmett 
was arbitrable and (2) whether the discharge of Semmett was 
proper. Paragraph ( 4) of the submission agreement provides 
that "In submitting this matter to arbitration neither party 
shaJl be deemed to have waived any rights given them by 
law." Company at all times contended that the discharge of 
Semmett was not subject to arbitration. 
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The collective bargaining agreement does not specifically 
mention the discharge of any employee. 'l'he agreement pro-
vides for a union shop, deductions from wages for union 
dues, strikes and lockouts, hours of work, holidays, transpor-
tation, contract work as related to subcontracts let by Com-
pany, meals, safety, clothing allowance, classification of work, 
and grievance procedure.* It also provides under the article 
entitled "Seniority" for promotions, layoffs, and rehiring. 
Vacations, illness, accidents, insurance, overtime, and wages 
and leaves of absence, assignability of the agreement and 
notices under it are also provided for. 
Article XI, entitled ''GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE" provides: 
'' Por the purpose of handling disputes arising over the per-
formance of this Agreement, there will be committeemen 
Plected by the Union members for the various departments or 
t~rafts. These committeemen will be recognized by the Com-
pany in the first stPp of adjusting such a complaint, which 
will be with the man involved, his foreman, and the committee-
men for such group or any other committeemen. 
''If they cannot settle the dispute, then it shall be reduced 
to writing and a committee of five ( 5) shall meet with a rep-
resentative of the Company to try to settle the dispute. The 
committeemen shall have fifteen (15) days to investigate such 
complaint after they are aware of their occurrence. The 
Company shall have seven (7) days to reply to the Commit-
tee. If the reply does not meet with the committee's approval, 
they may ask the Union to discuss the dispute with a repre-
sentative of the Company and try to reach settlement, if, in 
the opinion of Union officials, the dispute warrants such meet-
ing. This meeting to be held within fifteen (15) days after 
Company's reply to committee. If an Agreement cannot be 
reached the Company and Union shall select a third party to 
sit with a Company official as a Board of Arbitration with a 
decision of any two to be binding on the Company and the 
Union. The expense of such a third party shall be borne 
equally by the company and the Union." 
Union contends that the discharge of Semmett was arbi-
trable in that the collective bargaining agreement impliedly 
provides only for discharge upon a proper showing of cause 
for such discharge. Company, on the other hand, contends 
that nothing in the agreement relates to the discharge of 
any employee. Union also argues that Company by its conduct 
*This article will be set forth in full. 
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in taking the first two steps under the grievance procedure 
up until the point of arbitration recognized that discharge 
was a proper subject for arbitration under the collective bar-
gaining agreement and is now estopped to claim that the 
arbitration procedure does not apply. It is also argued by 
Union that Company, having submitted the arbitrability of the 
discharge to the arbitration committee, when the court order 
did not require such arbitration, has waived its right to 
object to the arbitrability of the question. 
The three arbitrators concurred in holding that the dispute 
was not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement 
and that they would have declined jurisdiction had it not been 
for the order of the court requiring arbitration on the merits. 
A majority of the arbitrators then concluded that Semmett 
had been improperly discharged and ordered his reinstate-
ment with full seniority rights as of the date of his dis-
charge and ''made whole for all wages which he would have 
earned from July 8, 1952, less any wages received from any 
other source and any unemployment compansation. '' 
[la] We are of the opinion that Company is bound by 
the terms of the submission to arbitration agreement. 
[2] It is the rule that "The powers of an arbitrator are 
limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of 
submission (Bierlein v. Johnson, 73 Cal.App.2d 728, 733 
[166 P.2d 644])." (Pacific Fire etc. Btfreatt v. Bookbinders' 
etc. Union, 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 [251 P.2d 694].) (See 
also Stenzor v. Leon, 130 Cal.App.2d 729, 732 [279 P.2d 802] ; 
Flores v. Barman, 130 Cal.App.2d 282, 286 [279 P.2d 81] ; 
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186, 
187 [260 P.2d 156] ; 30 Cal.Jur.2d, § 133, p. 84.) [lb] In 
the case at bar, although the trial court merely ordered arbi-
tration of the merits of Semmett's discharge, Company agreed, 
in the submission agreement to the arbitration of the two 
questions: Whether Semmett's discharge was arbitrable and 
to the arbitration of the discharge of Semmett. This it was 
not bound to do since the arbitrability of the question could 
have been considered after the judgment confirming the arbi-
trator's award on the merits of the controversy. (Sjoberg v. 
Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 116, 118, 119 [199 P.2d 668].) [3] With 
respect to Company's argument that it had specifically pro-
vided that it was not to be deemed ''to have waived any 
rights given them by law" it appears that Company may not 
agree to arbitrate a question and then, if the decision goes 
against it, litigate the question in another proceeding. In 
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v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 186, 
187 [260 P.2d 156], the court had much the same problem 
under consideration. It was there held: "'l'he whole spirit 
of the agreement is that these parties, when the agreement 
was executed, wanted to settle the many court actions then 
pending between them, carefully selected a competent and 
impartial arbitrator, and were then content, so long as the 
arbitrator acted within the limitations of the arbitration 
statute, to accept his determination as final, both as to law 
and facts. Now that such determinations have not turned 
out as this appellant hoped, he is attempting to secure a 
complete reconsideration of many legal (and some factual) 
determinations in this court. Under his agreement and the 
provisions of the law, except where permitted to do so by stat-
ute, this he cannot do." It was then said that "If the 
arbitrator in fact created causes of action not within the 
arbitration agreement, and then decided these unsubmitted 
issu<:>s, that would require a vacation of the award as being 
in excess of the arbitrator's powers within the meaning of 
section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure." As we have 
heretofore pointed out the arbitrators in the case at bar 
decided the issues submitted to them by the parties. 
[4] It is of course well settled that arbitrators do not 
exceed their powers merely because they assign an erroneous 
reason for their decision. (Southside Theatres, Inc. v. Moving 
P. etc. Local, 131 Cal.App.2d 798, 803 [281 P.2d 31] ; McKay 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [243 P.2d 35] ; 
Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 189 
[260 P.2d 156] .) [5] In Southside Theatres, Inc. v. Moving 
P. etc. Local, S1lpra, pages 802, 803, the court said: ''Any 
controversy under a collective bargaining contract which 
requires first a determination that the contract does or does 
not define the rights or duties of the parties in an existing 
situation is subject to arbitration if the agreement provides 
for the arbitration of disputes that arise out of the contract. 
"The foundational questions are : vVb at was submitted to 
the arbitrators and what did they decide~" The arbitrators 
here decided that the controversy was arbitrable and that 
Semmett 's discharge was improper. [6] The merits of the 
controversy between the parties are not subject to judicial 
review (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. 8. T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 
228, 233 [174 P.2d 441]; Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515, 
523 [212 P.2d 233] ; Crofoot v. Blair Holclings Corp., 119 
Cal.App.2d 156, 185 [260 P.2d 156]; Myers v. Richfield Oil 
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Corp., 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [220 P.2d 973] ; Riley v. Pig'n 
Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal.App.2d 650, 651 [241 P.2d 294]). 
[7] The trial court did not err in refusing to receive 
in evidence two exhibits offered by Company. These exhibits 
tended to show that despite the submission agreement, Com-
pany did not intend the arbitrability of the question to be 
decided by the arbitrators. We have heretofore discussed the 
effect of the submission agreement which defined the seope of 
the arbitrators' powers and that the award made by the 
arbitrators was elearly within the issues submitted to them. 
The judgment confirming the award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., eoneurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion, on any fair 
view of the reeord before us, the arbitrators did not deeide 
against the eompany, but rather refused to deeide at all, the 
question whether the diseharge of an employe was an arbi-
trable matter. As stated in the majority opinion (ante, p. 
108), the original petition of the union to the superior court 
"was for either arbitration of the grievance of Semmett, 
or arbitration of the question whether the Semmett discharge 
was subject to arbitration. The superior court [on July 8, 
1952] ordered only arbitration of the merits of the discharge.'' 
The company throughout these proceedings has consistently 
taken the position that the question of discharge was not an 
arbitrable matter under the collective bargaining agreement 
between the company and the union. The original appeal of the 
company from the order directing arbitration was dismissed by 
the District Court of Appeal of its own motion, in Corbett v. 
Petroleum Maintenance Co. (1953), 119 Cal.App.2d 21, 22 
[258 P.2d 1077], on the ground that the order directing arbi-
tration was not appealable. But as the District Court of 
Appeal points out, the company's ground of appeal was that 
"the [collective bargaining] agreement is silent as to any 
restrietion upon the employer's right to diseharge and, there-
fore, the matter of the discharge of the employee is not with-
in the scope of the agreed arbitration procedure.'' 
After dismissal of this former appeal, the company and 
the union in writing ''submit [ted] to arbitration . . . the 
following dispute: 
"(1) ... Company, the Employer, asserts that the matter 
of the discharge of an employee is not subject to arbitration. 
. . . Union, . . . representing the Employee, Frank Scm-
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rnett, asserts that the matter of the discharge of an employee 
is subject to arbitration. The Union asserts that its position 
has been upheld by the Superior Court [by the above men-
tioned order of July 8, 1952] ... 
'' (2) The Company asserts that if the matter of discharge 
is subject to arbitration, the discharge of Frank Semmett, 
the employee, was proper. The Union asserts that the dis-
charge was improper . . . 
" ( 4) In submitting this matter to arbitration neither party 
shall be deemed to have waived any rights given them by 
Iaw."1 
The majority of the arbitrators, in their opinion filed after 
the arbitration hearing, announced that they believed that 
they were bound by the superior court order of July 8, 1952, 
based on the ''conclusion of law that a question of discharge 
is arbitrable and is within the grievance procedure of the 
[collective bargaining] agreement between the parties"; the 
majority opinion of the arbitrators further set out in detail 
the reasons why the majority would have determined that the 
question was not arbitrable had they believed that such ques-
tion was open. 
The opinion of the dissenting arbitrator states, "It is axio-
matic that arbitration can be compelled only where parties 
have agreed to this method of settling disputes, and then only 
to the extent provided. The discharge in question was there-
fore not subject to arbitration and, in my view, the decision 
of the Superior Court to the contrary is erroneous. 
"The majority eon curs in this conelusion. It, however, 
holds that the Superior Court judgment is nevertheless bind-
ing upon this Board. The majority states that absent such 
judgment, it would hold the dispute not to be arbitrable. 
The anomalous position in which this places the majority is 
well shown by the result in this case. The very factors which 
1 A transcript of the proceedings before the arbitrators, lodged with 
this court, shows that, at the beginning of the hearing before the 
arbitrators, counsel for the company and also counsel for the union made 
clear their position that they were submitting to the arbitrators the 
question whether the right to discharge was arbitrable. Counsel for the 
company took the position that under the collective bargaining agree-
ment there was no provision for arbitration concerning discharges, and 
on this ground claimed that the arbitrators had no "jurisdiction." 
Counsel for the company appears mistnkcn in his claim that the arbi-
trators were without ''jurisdiction'' to determine arbitrability, for thnt 
question had been expressly submitted to the arbitrators, but be was 
correct in his position that the question whether discharge was an 
arbitrable issue was open. 
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go into the question of arbitrability are the ones upon which 
the decision upon the merits must be based. Thus, it is eon-
ceded that the collective bargaining agreement only provides 
for the arbitration of disputes concerning the performance 
of the agreement and that therefore disputes concerning 
discharges are not arbitrable. Yet, assuming arbitrability, 
the Company's action can only be upset if it is in violation 
of the agreement. But it cannot be in violation of the agree-
ment since there is no limitation upon the right to discharge; 
if there were the matter would be arbitrable. But the ma-
jority says it is not arbitrable, and to be consistent it would 
have to hold that for the same reasons the Company's action 
was not in violation of the agreement. However, it has not 
done so.'' 
The award of the arbitrators decides that the superior court 
order of July 8, 1952, "renders this dispute arbitrable" and 
that "Semmett shall be reinstated." 
When the union moved the superior court to confirm the 
arbitrator's award, the company, although it did not move 
to vacate the award, took the position by its answer to the 
union's application for confirmation that "the arbitrators 
were without jurisdiction and had no authority to make the 
award herein sought to be enforced for the reasons that [the 
collective bargaining agreement] . . . contains no restrictions 
or limitations on the defendants' [company's] right to dis-
charge an employee. That the Arbitrators exceeded their 
powers in making the award ... '' 
In my opinion there was presented to the superior court by 
the foregoing allegations of the company's answer (perhaps 
ineptly but with sufficient certainty to make necessary a rul-
ing thereon) the following question of law: Have the arbi-
trators ''exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them, that a mutual, final and definite award, upon the sub-
ject matter submitted, was not made"~ (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1288, par. (d), which requires vacation of an award in the 
quoted situation.) In my further opinion, the arbitrators 
did imperfectly execute their powers because they made it 
clear (by their majority opinion and award) that they thought 
that because of the superior court order of July 8, 1952, the 
question of the arbitrability of discharges, although it had 
been submitted to them, was not properly before them and 
that they were bound to rule that such question was arbi-
trable. In fact, the question of arbitrability was before the 
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arbitrators and their refusal to decide it was an imperfect 
exercise of their powers and duties. 
Here the arbitrators did not, as the majority opinion of 
this court states, decide the question of arbitrability against 
the company; rather, upon a reasonable interpretation of the 
record, they refused to decide that question in the erroneous 
belief that it was not open. I recognize and accept the rule, 
quoted in the majority opinion from Pacific Fire etc. Bureau 
v. Bookbinders' etc. Union (1952), 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114 
[251 P.2d 694], that "The powers of an arbitrator are limited 
and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of sub-
mission.'' But when the arbitrators refuse to decide a ques-
tion submitted to them, it seems to me that they are im-
properly and insufficiently exercising their powers and duties. 
The end result of affirmance of the present superior court 
judgment which confirms the arbitrators' award is that the 
company, despite all its attempts to keep the matter open, 
has never had an opportunity either to litigate on appeal or 
to arbitrate the question determined against it by the original 
superior court conclusion of law that "a question of discharge 
is arbitrable.'' 
For the reasons above stated, I would reverse the order con-
firming the award. 
Spence, J., and :McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 10, 
1957. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
